Abstract
Introduction
Even assuming perfect cryptography, the design of protocols for secure electronic transactions is highly errorprone and conventional validation techniques based on informal arguments and/or testing are not sufficient for meeting the required security level.
On the other hand, verification tools based on formal methods have been quite successful in discovering new flaws in well-known security protocols. These methods include state exploration using model-checking as in [16, 25, 22, 5, 21 , logic programming [19] , term rewriting [6, 151, tree automata [I21 or combination of these techniques. Other approaches aim at proving the correctness of a protocol . They are based on authentication logics or proving security property by induction using interactive proofassistants (see [3, 231) .
Although the general verification problem is undecidable [ 1 11 even in the restricted case where the size of messages is bounded [IO] , it is interesting to investigate decidable fragments of the underlying logics and their complexity. The success of the practical verification tools indicates that there may exist interesting decidable fragments that capture many concrete security problems. For instance, [ 101 shows that when messages are bounded and when no nonces (i.e. new data) are created by the protocol and the intruder, then the existence of a secrecy flaw is decidable and DEXPTIMEcomplete. The complexity for the case of finite sessions is mentioned as open in [IO] .
A related decidability result is presented in [ 14, I] . The authors give a procedure for checking whether an unsafe state is reachable by the protocol. Their result holds for the case of finite sessions but with no bounds on the intruder messages. The detailed proof in [ I ] does not allow general messages (not just names) as encryption keys. The authors have not analyzed the complexity of their procedure'.
Our result states that for a fixed number of interleaved protocol runs but with no bounds on the intruder messages the existence of an attack is NP-complete. We allow public key encryption as well as the possibility of symmetric encryption with any message. In this paper we only consider secrecy properties. However authentication can be handled in a similar way. Hence, here a protocol is considered insecure if it is possible to reach a state where a secret term gets possessed by the intruder. Thanks to the proof technique, we have been able to extend the result directly to various intruder models and to protocols with choice points.
Layout of the paper:
We first introduce in Section I our model of protocols and intruder and the notion of normal attack. Then in Section 2 we study properties of derivations with intruder rules. This allows us to derive polynomial bounds for normal attacks and then to show that the problem of finding a normal attack is in NP. We show in Section 3 that the existence of an attack is NP-hard. In Appendix we show that the NP procedure of Section 2 can be extended to handle stronger intruder model (Appendix 4.1) weaker intruder model (Appendix 4.2) and also protocols with choice points (Appendix 4.3). term ::= V a r I Atoms 1 (term,term) I {ter4PKeys I {teWtSerm Let V a r ( t ) be the set of variables that occur in a term t. A substitution assigns terms to variables. A ground substitution assigns messages to variables. The application of a substitution a to a term t is written ta. We also write [ . +-U ] the substitution a defined by a(.) = U and a ( y ) = y for y # 2. The set of subterms oft is denoted by Sub(t). These notations are extended to sets of terms E in a standard way.
For instance, Ea = {ta 1 t E E } .
A principal (except the initiator) replies after receiving a message matching a specified term associated to its current state. Then from the previously received messages (and initial knowledge) he builds the next message he will send. This construction amounts to substitute values for the variables of another specified term.
A protocol is given with a finite set of principal names 
Each step L of the protocol extends the current environment by adding the corresponding message SLa when R,a is present. One can remark that principals are not allowed to generate any new data. But this is not bedded since the number of sessions is finite: New datas are no more than principals's initial knowledge.
S,-l(k)a E Ek.
We consider a model of protocols in the style of [4] . The actions of any honest principal are specified as a partially ordered list that associates to (the format of) a received message its corresponding reply. The activity of the intruder is modeled by rewrite rules on sets of messages. We consider that the initialization phase of distributing keys and other information between principals is implicit. The approach is quite natural and it is simple to compile a wide range of protocol descriptions to our formalism. For instance existing tools such as CAPSL [7, 81 or CASRUL [15] would perform this translation with few modifications. We present our model more formally now.
Names and Messages
The messages exchanged during the protocol execution are built using pairing (-,-) and encryption operators {-}', {-}!. We add a superscript to distinguish between public key ( P ) and symmetric key (") encryptions. The set of basic messages is finite and denoted by Atoms. It contains names for principals and atomic keys from the set Keys.
Since we have a finite number of sessions we also assume any nonce is a basic message: we consider that it has been created before the session and belongs to the initial knowledge of the principal that generates it. Any message can be used as a key for symmetric encryption. Only elements from Keys are used for public key encryption. Given a public key (resp. private key) IC, IC-' denotes the associated private key (resp. public key)
and it is an element of Keys. Given a symmetric key k then, k-' will denote the same key.
The messages are then generated by the following (tree) grammar:
For concision we denote by ml , m2, . . . , m, the set of messages { ml, m2, . . . mn}, Given two sets of messages M and M' we denote by M , M' the union of their elements and given a set of messages A4 and a message t , we denote by M , t the set M U { t } .
Protocol Specification
We shall describe protocols by a list of actions for each principal. In order to describe the protocol steps we introduce message terms (or terms in short). We assume that we have since the possession of a key or a nonce by a principal is implicit through the actions he can perform.
Intruder
In the Dolev Yao model [9] the intruder has the ability to eavesdrop, to divert and memorize messages, to compose and decompose, to encrypt and decrypt when he has the key, to generate new messages and send them to other participants with a false identity. We assume here without loss of generality that the intruder systematically diverts messages, possibly modifies them and forwards them to the receiver under the identity of the official sender. In other words all communications are mediated by a hostile environment represented by the intruder. The intruder actions for modifying the messages are simulated by rewrite rules on sets of messages. The rewrite relation is defined by M + M' if there exists one of the rule 1 + T in the array below such that 1 is a subset of M and M' is obtained by replacing 1 by T in M .
We write +* for the reflexive and transitive closure of +.
The set of messages SO represents the initial knowledge of the intruder. We assume that at least the name of the intruder Charlie belongs to this set.
Intruder rules are divided in several groups: rules for composing or decomposing messages. These rewrite rules are the only one we consider in this paper and any mention of "rules" refer to &se rules. In the following u, b and c represent any message and K represents any element See Table 1 for complete the intruder rules, and Appendix for an extension. We denote the application of a rule R to a set E of messages with result E' by E + R E'.
We write L, = {,!,,(a)( for all messages a } , and Ld in the same way, and a is called the principal term of a rule L, (a) or Ld(a). We call derivation a sequence of rule applications EO + R~ El + R~ .. +R,, E,. The rules Ri for i = 1, .., n are called the rules of this derivation D. We write R E D (abusively) to denote that R is one of the rules Ri, f o r i = 1, .., n, that has been used in the derivation D.
One can remark that if the intruder was allowed to generate new data he won't be more powerful. He can already create infinitely many data only known to himself with sim- ... assuming that N is only known by the intruder)
Attacks
There is an attack in N protocol sessions if the intruder can obtain the secret term in its knowledge set after completing at most N sessions. We consider first the case of a single session. Then we shall sketch in Subsection 2.4 how to reduce the case of several sessions to the unique session case. Since received messages are filtered by principals with the left-hand sides of protocol steps, the existence of an attack can be expressed as a constraint solving problem: is there a way for the intruder to build from its initial knowledge and already sent messages a new message (defined by a substitution for the variables of protocol steps) that will be accepted by the recipient, and so on, until the end of the session, and such that at the end the secret term is known by the intruder.
We introduce now a predicate Forge for checking whether a message can be constructed by the intruder from some known messages. This predicate can be viewed as the combination of predicates synth and analz from L. Paul-
Definition 1 (Forge) Let E be a set of terms and let t be a term such that there is E' with E +* E' and t E E'. Then we say that t is forged from E and we denote it by t E Forge(E).
We assume that there is a special message Secret in the protocol specification. Let k be the cardinality of 1, i.e. the total number of steps of the protocol. An attack is a protocol execution where the intruder can modify each intermediate environment and where the message Secret belongs to the final environment. In an attack the intruder is able to forge any message expected by a principal by using its initial knowledge and already sent messages (spied in the environments). This means, formally, that a given protocol execution, with sequence of environments EO, .., Ek, is an attack if for all 1 _< i _< IC we have E~-I , S~-I (~)~ +* Ei ever by definition t E Forge(E) iff there is E' such that E +* t , E'. Hence we can reformulate the definition of an attack using the predicate Forge: 
. , k s u c h t h a t f o r a l l i = l , . . . ,IC,wehave:
where
We introduce now a measure on attacks and a notion of minimal attack among all attacks, called normal attack. We shall prove in the next sections that normal attacks have polynomial bounds for a suitable representation of terms.
The size of a message term t is denoted It1 and defined as: 
., IRkul) is minimal
Clearly if there is an attack there is a normal attack since the measure is a well-founded ordering on finite multisets of nonnegative integers. We now present an NP procedure for detecting the existence of a normal attack.
Existence of a Normal Attack is in NP
We first show some basic facts on the representation of message terms as Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG). Then we shall show how to obtain from any derivation a more compact one. We will then be able to prove that a normal attack has a polynomial size w.r.t. the size of the protocol and intruder knowledge, when using DAG representations.
Preliminaries
The DAG-representation of a set E of message terms is the graph ( V , Z) with labeled edges, where: 0 the set of vertices V = Sub(E), the set of subterms of E.
Remark 1
The DAG representation is unique. If n is the number of elements in Sub(t), one can remark that ( V , &) has at most n nodes and 2.n edges. Hence its size is linear in n, and for convenience we shall define the DAG-size of E , denoted by IEIDAG, to be the number of distinct subterms of E , i.e the number of elements in Sub(E). For a term t , we simply write ItlDAG for I{t} IDAG.
Guess a correct execution order
x : Z -+ { 1, ..., IC}. Let Ri = RL-l(i) and Si = S;-l(i) fori E (1, ...,
Lemma 1 For all set of terms E, for all variable x and for all message t, we have: J E [ x t t]lDAG 5 / E , ti,,,
Proof: see Appendix 4.5. We are going to present an NP decision procedure for finding an attack, assuming an attack exists. The procedure amounts to guess a correct execution order x, a possible ground substitutions (T, for variables Var, with a DAGsize that is polynomially bounded, then to guess k+l lists of rules of length n2 and finally to check that when applying these lists of rules the intruder can build all expected messages as well as the secret.
We assume given a protocol specification { ( L , R: +
Secret and a finite set of messages SO for initial intruder knowledge. If P,So is not given in DAG-representation, they are first converted to this format (in polynomial time).
We assume that the DAG-size of P, So is n, the finite set of variables in P is V, and (I1 = IC.
The NP procedure for checking the existence of an attack is written in Figure 1 . To prove the correction of this procedure we shall show that we can put a bound on the length of normal attacks. We will first give properties about derivations. We will also give polynomial bounds on the substitution (T that is used in a normal attack.
Derivations
In this section, we will give some useful definitions and properties on derivations. We shall introduce a notion of normal derivation, denoted by Derivt(E). A related notion of normal derivation has been studied in 
0
We show in the next proposition that there always exists derivations of a term t from a set E with a number of rules bounded by the DAG-size of initial and final terms t , E.
This will be very useful to bound the length of the derivations involved in the research of an attack.
Proposition 1 For any set of terms E and for any term t, if
Proof: Let us prove that the number of steps in Derivt(E) is at most It, ElDAG by examining the terms composed or decomposed for any rule R that has been applied in
Derivt ( E ) :
From Lemma 2 every term decomposed (with Ld) is derived from E by decompositions exclusively. Hence every term which is decomposed was a subterm of E and is counted in lEIDAG.
From Lemma
3 every term composed (by L,) is used as a subterm of a key or o f t . Hence it is counted in It, EIDAG. Every rule R either composes or decomposes a term, but R never composes (resp. decomposes) a term which has already been composed (resp. decomposed). Hence to each subterm of E or t corresponds at most one rule application in Derivt ( E ) for composing or decomposing it. (merging identical subterms) Hence the number of terms composed or decomposed in Derivt(E) is bounded by the number of distinct subterms of E , t and the first part of the result follows. Since each intermediate term is a subterm of E , t , the second part of the proposition follows.
0
An other kind of useful derivations is shown in the following Proposition 2. It will allow us to prove the Lemma 4. 
Proposition 2 Let t E Forge(E) and y E Forge(E) be given with Deriv,(E) ending with an application of a rule in L,. Then there is a derivation D with goal t starting from E, and verifying

Polynomial Bounds on Normal Attacks
We shall prove that when there exists an attack then a normal attack can always be constructed from subterms that are already occurring in the problem specification. This will allow to give bounds on the messages size and on the number of rewritings involved in such an attack.
Hence let us assume a protocol P = {RI + S l I L E I}, a secret message Secret and a set of messages SO as the initial intruder knowledge. We assume that there exists an attack described by a ground substitution a and a correct execution order 7r : Z -+ 1,. . . , IC (where IC is the cardinality of I). We define Ri = Ra-l and Si = for i = 1, . . . ,IC.
We also define: S P as the set of subterms of the terms in the set P = {RjIj = 1,. . . ,IC} U {Sjlj = 0,. . . ,IC}, and SP<i the set of subterms of the terms in {RjIj = We assume without loss of generality that Charlie E SO 1,. . . ] i)u {Sjlj = 0,. . . , i } .
i.e. the intruder initially knows its name !
Definition 6 Let t and t' be two terms and 8 a ground substitution. Then t is a 8-match oft' if t is not a variable and t8 = t'. This will be denoted by t 5 0 t'
The following lemma is one of the key property of this paper. It allows us to prove that every substitution a in a normal attack is only build with parts of the protocol specification. In this way, we will be able to prove that all substitution a in a normal attack has a DAG-size bounded by a polynomial in the protocol DAG-size.
Lemma4 Given a normal attack a, for all variable x, there exists t a ( . ) such that t E SP.
Proof Let a be a normal attack, and let us first assume that there exists s such that for all t such that t L,, a ( . ) we have t $ ! S P , and let us derive a contradiction. Let us define: ( E i , a , P , ( a , P ) ) S is a valid step since (b) else e ( . ) = ( a , P) and we can take Li = 0 since
Charlie E Ei, for all i. The consequence of Theorem 1 is that the DAG-size of the messages that are sent or received during a normal attack is bounded by a polynomial in the DAG size of the protocol. This result has crucial practical implications since it means that when searching for an attack we can give a simple a priori bound on the dag-size of the messages needed to be forged by the intruder:
same reasoning for Li = L,({a}p).
if Li
Iu(z)IDAG 5 lEplDAG with Ep C SP: since IEplDAG I JPIDAG this proves the theorem.
Protocol Insecurity with Finite Number of Sessions is in NP
We recall here the NP procedure for checking the existence of an attack and shows its correctness.
We assume given a protocol specification
Secret and a finite set of messages SO for initial intruder knowledge. If P, SO is not given in DAG-representation, they are first converted to this format (in polynomial time).
We assume that the DAG-size of P, SO is n, the finite set of variables in P is V , and Z = IC.
Let us first remark that the procedure written in Section 2.1 is NP:
A correct execution order is a permutation of 1, and can be guessed in polynomial time. 0 If the procedure answers YES, the checking performed on the guessed derivations proves than the protocol has an attack.
Multiple sessions: When considering several protocol sessions simultaneously we assume that they are independent (in the absence of intruder) and therefore one can assume that their specifications do not share variables. In order to reduce the security problem for several sessions to the security problem for one session, one can simply compose the sessions into a unique session of a more complex protocol. This construction is sketched below.
Given two disjoint partially orders < and <' defined on disjoint sets W and W' we define the partial order < . <'
Given two protocol specifications P I , P2, let N a m e s l , Names2 their respective sets of principals. We can assume up to some renaming that for every principal A the associated partially ordered sets W i and W j in protocol PI and P2 resp. are disjoint. Then we get a new protocol for the sequential composition PI .Pz by taking
where Z = { ( A , i) I A E Names1 U Names2 and i E W i U W j } For each principal A we associate now the partially ordered set ( W i U W j , < w: . < wi; )
We get similarly a protocol PI 1 lP2 for parallel composition by taking for each principal A the partially ordered set ( W i U W j , <w: U <q).
NP-hardness
We show now that the existence of an attack when the input are a protocol specification and initial knowledge of the intruder is NP-hard by reduction from 3-SAT. The proof is similar to the one given by [ 11 for their model. where ~i , j E {0,1} and xo (resp.z') means x (resp.1z). 
Let us define
0 g ( & i , j , zi,j) = xi,j if ~i , j = 0 0 g(&i,j, zi,j) = { q j }~ if ~; , j = 1 V i E I ,
Conclusion
We have proved that when the number of sessions is fixed, in order to find an attack an intruder needs only to forge messages with polynomial size, when using a the dag-representation. We have also given an NP-procedure for finding an attack with a fixed number of sessions. Our formal model of protocols and attacks supports non-atomic symmetric keys. Several interesting variants of this model can be easily reduced to it.
If the intruder is allowed to generate any number of new datas, then we can prove with the same techniques that any attack he can launch can be also obtained by replacing in every message his freshly generated by his name (Charlie). The normal principals won't see any difference. Hence the intruder does not gain any strength when being able to create nonces, in the finite session case.
For instance we could consider that a principal is unable to recognize that a message supposed to be encrypted by some key K has really been constructed by an encryption with K, (see extension in Appendix 4.1). To obtain a protocol model where principals may recognize whether a real encryption has been performed one simply extend any cipher with a special fixed field.
We have considered that the intruder can eavesdrop, divert messages, and impersonate other principals. However we can model a more passive intruder, as described in Appendix 4.2, by ensuring that some messages cannot be modified (for instance when they are conveyed by a safe channel).
We have considered secrecy properties. Since correspondence attacks can also be expressed by an execution order and a polynomial number of Forge constraints they can be detected in NP too.
Finally our procedure can also be adapted to protocols admitting choice points, where a different subprotocol can be executed by a user according to some received message. Protocols such as SSL admit choice points. The modification of our model is described in Appendix 4.3. The detection of an attack remains in NP. We can summarized the known results in the Table 2 .
Directions for future works include broadening the scope of our approach to some cases where the number of sessions is unbounded or to commutativity of encryption operators.
Appendix
Extending the intruder model
The rules in Table 3 have to be added to the intruder rules in order to find attacks for protocols of the following type This protocol admits the following attack when the initial knowledge of intruder is {Charlie, {Secret}p}:
We can remark that such an attack cannot be found if the L, rules are not included in the intruder rewrite system. However it is easy to prove that NP-completeness remains valid when these L , and L , rules are included. These new rules The new protocol has a linear size in the initial one, even in a dag representation. A,M1))P,A,; and (A,$ : {L4,M2)1P,A,, * . .'. This
{(
Adding choice points
We extend the protocol model in order to allow for choice points. Typically the field of a message may contain information about the type of cryptography negotiated for the rest of the session. Hence the subsequent message exchanges may depend from the content of this field. 1,j') ). This block construction is similar to a case structure in programming languages. A protocol execution with substitution a must now also satisfy: For every priority block (indexed by i ) , we,apply step ( A , ( i , j ) First we can remark that all properties, lemmas, and proofs about derivations remain valid since we did not change the intruder rules. Therefore, the only proof to be adapted is the one of Lemma 4: We build a new substitution a' from a , and we must prove that it still satisfies the requirements for an attack. To do that, we assume first that Charlie, is used instead of Charlie for a ( . ) in the proof of the lemma.
We have Ria' E Forge(Soa', .., Si-lu') and Secret E Forge(Soa', .., Snu')., And for each attack ste,p n -' ( k ) = This way, we have proved that a' defines an attack with the same execution order and which is smaller than u (since ICharlie, I = 0. The lemma follows.
Since all bounds on derivations and attacks remain valid we only need to add to our insecurity detection procedure, an extra guessing step for the branches to be taken at choice points in order to derive an NP procedure for the more general case of protocols with choice. This proves the property, since the DAG-size of a set of terms is equal to number of distinct subterms they contain.
Otway-Rees Protocol
0
